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VARIETIES OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Congress has shown increasing concern about oversight as the federal
bureaucracy has expanded in size and program initiation has passed
to the executive branch. In 1946, following the New Deal and World
War II, a provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act prescribed
&dquo;continuous watchfulness&dquo; over the actions of the executive agencies in
carrying out the laws. In the 1970 Amendments to the Act, Congress
required most committees to issue periodic reports on their oversight
endeavors. This was an obvious attempt to spur them to action. Data
gathered on congressional oversight in 1973 for the Bolling Committee
staff and comments by congressmen before the Committee indicated
that this requirement had not produced the desired effect and the House
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amended its rules in an attempt to stimulate more activity and provide
some coordination. There is sentiment in the Senate for similar action
as indicated by the Interim Report of the Commission on the Operation
of the Senate (U.S. Congress, 1976) and by Senate support for &dquo;Sunset&dquo;
legislation in 1978.
When it comes to performance Bibby’s (1968) comment that over-
sight is &dquo;Congress’ neglected function&dquo; is still the standard introductory
observation in papers on the subject. The second definition of oversight
found in Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary may be unintendedly
appropriate: &dquo;an overlooking or something overlooked; (an) omission
or error due to inadvertence.&dquo; However, the first meaning, &dquo;watchful
care or supervision&dquo; is surely what we have in mind when we speak
about congressional oversight.
There is a debate within the scholarly literature about how to define
oversight. Harris proposes a relatively narrow definition. For him,
oversight &dquo;strictly speaking, refers to review after the fact. It includes
inquiries about policies that are or have been in effect, investigations of
past administrative actions, and the calling of executive officers to
account for their financial transactions&dquo; (Harris, 1964). Ogul takes a
much broader approach and defines legislative oversight as &dquo;behavior
by legislators and their staffs, individually or collectively, which
results in an impact, intended or not, on bureaucratic behavior,&dquo; (Ogul,
1976). The Ogul definition is useful in that it directs attention to the
fact that oversight is a latent as well as a manifest function of Congress
and that many of the things done by Members and Senators contribute
to oversight. It is so broad, however, that it is hard to exclude very
many congressional activities from inclusion under the oversight rubric.
I define oversight as congressional review of the actions of the federal
departments, agencies, and commissions and of the programs and
policies they administer. This includes review that takes place during
program and policy implementation as well as afterwards, but excludes
much of what Congress now does when it considers proposals for new
programs or even for the expansion of current programs.
As noted above, it is often asserted that Congress neglects oversight.
What does occur, with a few exceptions, is said to be neither continuing,
comprehensive, nor systematic (Bibby, 1968). Agencies or programs are
rarely overseen persistently, the focus of the oversight effort is often
very narrow, and it is certainly the case that systematic oversight efforts
(those involving a methodical approach governed by some rational
principle which orders and gives unity to the elements of the effort)
are just about impossible to uncover.
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A basic assumption underlying much of the normative discussion in
this article is that, simply stated, oversight of administration is desirable
because it provides one mechanism by which those who administer the
public policies which singly or cumulatively affect us in fundamental
ways can be held accountable and their programs evaluated. I also
assume that more oversight is usually better than less.1 The idea behind
this is quite simple: even oversight performed sporadically, focused on
fairly narrow subjects, and utilizing an unsystematic approach should at
least hold down flagrant abuses of power by administrators, make them
more responsive to the wishes of Congress, and provide Members and
Senators with better knowledge and use in making judgments about the
effectiveness of programs. Persistent oversight of programs or agencies
is, § assume, more likely to yield these benefits than random reviews,
but the benefits of regular efforts in an area may not be commensurate
with the high costs in time and effort involved unless the quality of the
oversight is improved.2 And quality can only be significantly improved
through efforts to evaluate programs in a comprehensive and systematic
manner. Great difficulties are suggested by the latter point because our
political system diffuses authority and promotes legislation which often
enumerates unclear and even contradictory goals for programs.
The issue, then, is how to promote more and better oversight. Sepa-
rating the elements of quantity and quality is, of course, a simplifying
device. If one accepts it, a futher simplification will aid us in the analysis.
This involves a division of the factors often thought to promote over-
sight into those whose effect is mainly to increase the quantity (incidence)
of oversight and those which are very likely also to increase the quality
of oversight. A further distinction, given our interest in change, will be
drawn between those factors which are subject to planned manipulation
(i.e., can be affected through policy changes) and those which are
basically beyond our control.
FACTORS MAINLY PROMOTING A GREATER
INCIDENCE OF OVERSIGHT
The literature is filled with propositions about factors which promote
oversight.3 A good number seem mainly to affect the quantity of over-
sight done. the following is a brief enumeration of some of these factors
plus some commentary where appropriate:
( 1 ) Split partisan control of the presidency and Congress. If different
parties control the presidency and Congress, the majority in Congress
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has an incentive to harass and embarrass the executive for partisan
gain. This is not a factor which is conducive to persistent oversight
of a policy or agency and it is not something which we can control.
However, there is one reform which has been suggested which would
produce much the same stimulus to oversight and would always be as
effective as split control; that is to give the minority party in Congress
(if it does not also controls the presidency) control of the Government
Operations Committees and of oversight subcommittees of the author-
ization committees.
(2) Casework problems. If the bureaucracy is unresponsive to
requests for assistance for the constituents of a strategically placed
Senator or Representative (i.e., a committee or subcommittee chairman
or ranking members, and the like), the oversight may be used as a
means to set things aright. One would not expect this to happen very
often or to require persistent oversight to correct the situation.
Casework problems are not something we can manipulate in the
interest of increased oversight, but there might be a way to use casework
information to stimulate oversight and perhaps improve its quality as
well. Congress could establish a central office to collect and analyze
information on casework requests and responses to them. A periodic
report which highlighted recurrent problems might create pressure for
(and information to be used in) a review of the agencies or programs
involved.
(3) Attempts to satisfy group interests important to the Senator or
Congressman. This is a broader category than two, but shares much in
common with it. Most established interests are well represented in the
bureaucracy; program administrators wish to provide them with
services, and administrators are especially responsive to those groups
of concern to important people in Congress. Every once in a while,
however, vocal dissatisfied groups stimulate spurts of oversight as in the
case of OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration).
(4) Desire to protect favored agencies. This factor is related to (3),
only here the Senators and Congressmen are mobilized by bureaucrats
as well as interest groups to protect a program which is threatened by the
administration or which needs a boost for some other reason. The
purpose of the oversight effort is to show how marvelous or essential
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the program is and to demonstrate the depthof its support. Such efforts
I believe, are especially common when there is split partisan contra
of the Congress and the presidency, but probably occur at all times.
&dquo;Sunset&dquo; laws of the type now under consideration in Congress would
unintentionally stimulate this type of oversight on a regular schedule.
While protective oversight is likely to be very superficial, every once in
a while it will expose flaws in a program which even its most ardent
supporter will want to see corrected.
(4a) Efforts to preempt opponents. Preemptive oversight is really
a special case of protective oversight. As Scher says, some oversight
(which he terms preventive) &dquo;results from an unenthusiastic determina-
tion that a limited examination of an agency by its friends may cost less
than an uncontrolled one by its enemies&dquo; (Scher, 1963). Such oversight
is likely to be superficial and brief, but the incentive to perform it is
subject to some manipulation. A restructuring of committee jurisdic-
tions which encouraged &dquo;unfriendly&dquo; committees to take a look at the
program or agency in question would encourage this type of oversight.
The new budget process may be a particularly important stimulus to
preemptive oversight since authorization committees will want to
present what looks like a strong case to the Budget Committees. I will
return to this point later in describing factors leading to higher quality
oversight (because should the budget process really work it is likely that
superficial evaluations will be at a disadvantage in competition with
more systematic efforts).
(5) Committee structure. VVe now turn to a factor which is very much
subject to planned manipulation: committee structure. The more
decentralized the committee, the greater the likelihood of oversight. As
Ogul (1976) notes, &dquo;a decentralized committee-one in which power
over money, staff, and program is largely in the hands of subcommittee
chairmen and others-enhances the opportunity for oversight simply
because decision-making is dispersed.&dquo;
An additional factor which ought to lead to a greater incidence of
oversight is the establishment of oversight subcommittees. Once estab-
lished, many members of these subcommittees and their staffs should
want to make something of their assignments and greater oversight
activity i~ a likely result.
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(6) Increasing staff resources. The latter point raises the general
issue of staff resources. One would expect that increases in the number
of staff members on committees and subcommittees and increases
in staff assigned to individuals both in their offices and through their
committee assignments would lead to more oversight actfvityz There
would probably not be a one to one relationship between the number <11
staff and oversight, but one would expect some impact if only because
of the greater number of people available to do things. However, when
authority over staff is dispersed, increases in the number of staff are
more likely to lead to increases in the level of oversight activity than to
increases in systematic oversight. The problems of lack of coordination
and lack of an orderly, methodical approach to oversight are, in fact,
probably exacerbated by mere increases in the numbers of staff aides.
(7) Carruption, crisis, and publicity. Evidence of corruption, the
breakdown of a program, or the subversion of accepted governmental
processes as revealed by Watergate make oversight attractive because
the overseer is almost sure to make a favorable public impression. Most
such oversight is not planned for in advance and is likely to be short-
lived and somewhat superficial. But Watergate and the feeling that the
Great Society programs of the 1960s were ineffective may well have had
a profound impact on both the attentive public and the people in Con-
gress themselves, alerting them to the need for &dquo;continuous watchful-
ness,
A related factor which may bring Congressmen who oversee the
executive branch publicity previously unavailable is the rise of citizens’
lobbies with wide memberships or favorable public recognition. These
groups place oversight of target agencies and programs on their agendas
and publicize congressional response. They also are sources of infor-
mation previously unavailable. They seem to be a stimulus to more
oversight, but whether they will sustain themselves through time or
maintain a steady enough interest in an area to reward persistent con-
gressional attention is not yet clear.
FACTORS LIKELY TO INCREASE THE QUALITY OF OVERSIGHT
The analysis in the preceding section was inspired by recent academic
work (especially Scher, 1963; Ogul, 1976) that approaches oversight
from the perspective of the incentives of the Senators and Representa-
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tives. While more traditional scholars spend much time examining the
techniques of oversight (hearings, investigations, and so on) and the
resources available ~staff, money, and so on), Scher and Ogul ask what
net gains accrue to Senators and Representatives from performing over-
sight. Investigations, to take one example, can yield great publicity
dividends if they expose corruption or harass unpopular agencies, but
they may prove politically useless or even damaging if they turn up
nothing newsworthy or threaten powerful interests. Persistent oversight
of an agency or program is even more time-consuming than a one-shot
investigation and the publicity rewards are likely to be much lower. In
brief, when the disadvantages outweigh the advantages one assumes
that Congressmen and Senators shy away from oversight, even though
they may believe that it ought to be done.
When one looks at oversight in this way it is not surprising that per-
formance has usually been spotty at best, with persistent oversight a
rarity and really thorough systematic jobs almost nonexistent. How-
ever, over the last few years there have been changes in the environment
which ought to make improvement in the quality of oversight more
attractive to many in Congress. This certainly does not guarantee that
such improvements will occur, but it does make it more than an aca-
demic exercise to discuss factors likely to increase the quality of over-
sight.
(1) Relative resource scarcity. Many of us are accustomed to think-
ing about an ever-growing economy with rapidly increasing resources
available to government for the expansion of old programs and the
establishment of new ones. This environment discourages the careful
oversight of ongoing programs which usually have the support of
entrenched constituencies. There is no pressing reason to worry much
about efficiency or effectiveness in such an environment and, therefore,
little oversight should be expected, let alone systematic oversight.
We are now in a period of relative resource scarcity. In addition to
the strains brought on by the recent recession, many of the programs of
the 1960s proved much more expensive than originally estimated.
Together with the belief that many government programs are not work-
ing very well, these factors have created a _growing interest in the
attentive public in efforts to determine the effectiveness of programs
and to weigh them against possible alternate uses of the resources they
consume. There is a growing constituency which supports such efforts
and public acclaim to be gained by backing them. In addition, if hard
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choices must be made, the political costs may be reduced by transfer-
ring responsibility for unpopular decisions, lie., fixing the blame an the
outcome of carefully conducted, technically respectable analyses. In
short, relative resource scarcity has created a political climate which
makes high quality 1c systematic =oversight more attractive than it was
before.
(2) Influx of skeptical Senators anti Representatives. Contributing to
this climate is the influx into Congress of Democrats described by
Representative Bob Carr as &dquo;skeptical of government intervention and
solutions.&dquo; (Singer, 1978) Their electoral success reinforces the belief
that a skeptical view is popular with the public and may advance the
notion that thorough, systematic oversight can yield some political
payoff.
(3) Widespread program evaluation. In part as a consequence of the
relative scarcity of resources described above, in part as a reflection
of the spread of new analytic techniques, and in part as a function of
new mandates given to the executive agencies, congressional support
agencies, and congressional committees themselves, program evalua-
tion is being done all over the government. It is not always well done and
it is often self-serving, but it does put pressure on Congress to examine
the findings and at least to consider the results.
A major problem is that low quality evaluations are encouraged by
the types of programs Congress typically passes. In order to build a
coalition large enough to pass a bill and in an effort to offend as few
people as possible, Congress often establishes programs which lack
clear, noncontradictory goals for the agencies to accomplish.
Schick (1976), however, notes that
when Congress muddles through without a clear specification of purpose, the
process of evaluation is not aborted. Rather, it must begin with executive imple-
mentation rather than with textbook clarity about objectives. Congress, in fact, has
two legitimate tasks to get the Executive to produce relevant evaluations. First,
Congress can write into law a mandate for the agency to evaluate its program;
second, Congress can demand that the evaluative measures used by the agency
reflect congressional interest and perspectives, not merely the orientation of the
implementing agency.... What is required is the prescription in law of a process
that agencies must adhere to in evaluating their activities, including milestones for
the crucial events in the process, and a reporting schedule.
Schick’s proposals are realistic and would improve the prospects for
the intelligent utilization of program evaluations by Congress. They
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suggest a general point which is that congressional committees should
work closely with any agency (for example, (~At?) doingevaluations for
them--or the products are unlikely to have much impact. The process
Schick proposes will not eliminate all muddled program objectives and
the problems they create (it does, after all, involve continuous bargain-
ing between Congress and the agencies) and it will not result in high
quality program evaluations as measured by a set of absolute profes-
zonal standards, but it will increase the usefulness and impact of the
evaluations done,
Effective congressional utilization of evaluation requires the active
interest of Senators and Representatives, staff members who can skill-
fully direct the work of technical experts, and a congressional willing-
ness to bite the bullet at times when evaluation results cause some
political difficulties. No one can mandate such things, but changes in
the political climate and in the composition of Congress give some
encouragement that this might be possible.
It would be helpful, in this regard, to develop courses in evaluation
for politically skilled but analytically untrained staff. This would help
facilitate fruitful communication between Congress and evaluators
from the congressional support agencies or the executive departments.
(4) Reforms in the budget process. The most important potential
stimulus to systematic oversight by the Congress is the new budget
process established by the 1974 Budget Act. As Schick notes (1976):
there is some possibility that the new congressional budget process might bolster
the incentives for evaluation at [the authorization and appropriations] stages, if
only because of the pressure to consider particular spending demands in the light of
overall national priorities and other claims on the budget. Moreover, the new
congressional process might contribute to a narrowing of the authorizations-
appropriations gap, the proclivity to authorize one level of expenditure but to
appropriate at a much lower level. More realistic authorisations might encourage
committees to take more careful looks at the programs subject to their oversight.
A possible scenario is that some presentations to the Budget Com-
mittees by the authorization committees of their views and recommenda-
tions on matters to be covered in the budget resolutions (as required in
Section 301 (c) of the Act) will be based on evaluations designed to make
favored agencies and programs look good. (&dquo;Preemptive oversight&dquo; may
also take hold here-a desire to evaluate programs before CBO or the
Budget Committee staffs get to them.) With any luck, some authoriza-
tion committees will seek to influence the Budget Committee by present-
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ing more systematic evaluation than those of the competition in order to
back up their claims to the available funds. The Budget Committees, if
they reward such efforts, can thereby stimulate a continuing improve-
ment in the quality of oversight.
(5) Rotation of committee memberships. A final factor which might
increase the quality of oversight would be the regular rotation of com-
mittee assignments. Such a procedure could have several benefits.
First, it would loosen the ties which Senators and Representatives
develop with the agencies whose programs their committees authorize
or fund. This, in itself, would be a stimulus to more objective perspec-
tives on programs and the agencies which administer them. Second, by
moving from committee to committee, each individual might develop a
better view of the overall situation. Third, because of the need to develop
a quick comprehension of the agencies and programs involved, the
Senators and Representatives might be more interested in seeing
thorough studies of relevant policies, especially studies which compared
benefits across programs or agencies.
The difficulties with this proposal are many, but two (leaving aside
resistance to change) stand out. First, unless the staff attached to the
committees had low turnover, committees would be even more reliant
on the executive for information and expertise than they are now.
Second, if the staffs remained in place, the perspectives of program
clientele groups and the agencies might still dominate the process.
Reserving some staff positions for people whose professional training is
in policy analysis might help here.
AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT BEHAVIOR
As I indicated earlier, the notion that oversight is Congress’s
neglected function is widespread, shared alike by scholars and legis-
lators. The survey of oversight activity by House Committees done by
the Congressional Research Service for the Bolling Committee (1974),
for example, showed that 11 % of all hearing and meeting days in the first
eight months of the Ninety-Third Congress (January I to September 5,
1973) were devoted to oversight.4 The prevailing inference drawn from
these data was that 11 % was too low a number. Thus, the Committee’s
report expressed a firm belief that &dquo;the oversight responsibilities of the
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House Committees are important and too often shunted aside by the
press of other business&dquo; and endorsed the view &dquo;that oversight of
programs and agencies should be a principal function of the Congress.&dquo;
The significance of the 11% figure will be considered below in my
examination of oversight activity over the last four Congresses.
This part of my article documents and provides some preliminary
analysis of trends in congressional oversight behavior. The analysis is
longitudinal, covering the Ninety-First, Ninety-Second, Ninety-Third,
and Ninety-Fourth Congresses, and comparative, contrasting the
House and the Senate. The analysis has two major purposes:
(1) to document the amount of oversight behavior in committee hearings and meet-
ings for each of the last four Congresses;
(2) to perform a preliminary analysis of the impact of some of the factors identified
earlier as likely to promote a greater incidence of oversight.
The nature of the data I employ here requires me to place my major
emphasis on the quantity of oversight, but I will also briefly consider
the implications of the evidence for the quality of the oversight being
done.
My data source is the Daily Digest which is appended to the Congres-
sional Record. The Daily Digest lists and summarizes the meetings and
hearings held by congressional committees. The time period coded for
each Congress is January 1 to July 4 of the first year of each session, i.e.,
1969, 1971, 1973, and 1975. The unit of analysis is a hearing and/or
meeting series dealing with what I call a &dquo;n~atter,&dquo; defined as a subject,
theme, or topic. The coders were instructed to code as a unit a series of
hearings and/ or meetings on one subject, topic, or theme. The number
of days of hearings and/ or meetings per matter was also recorded so that
the total amount of time spent on each matter can be recovered from
the data where that is desirable.
All hearings or meetings listed in the Daily Digest were coded so
that effort spent on oversight as measured from this source could be
compared to activities devoted to other purposes such as authoriza-
tions, nominations, and so on. Oversight is defined here conceptually as
congressional review of the actions of the executive branch and opera-
tionally as hearings or meetings held for any of the following purposes,
either singly or in combination: (1) to review and/or control unaccept-
able forms of bureaucratic behavior; (2) to ensure that the bureaucracy
implements the policy objectives of Congress; and (3) to determine the
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effectiveness of programs and policies. In addition committee hearings
or meetings described in less precise terms than those above simply as
efforts to review or oversee the activities of an a-gtnry were coded as
oversight. The numbered elements of the operational definition were
drawn from the CRS study for the Bolling Committee (U.S. Congress,
1974: 267). The difference between their study and mine is that I did not
code as oversight hearings or meetings designed, in their words, &dquo;to
analyze national (and international) problems requiring Federal action&dquo;
unless they were part of an effort to review government actions-in the
area.
Before proceeding, I should note some of the shortcomings of the
data set. First of all, it understates the amount of committee activity to
some extent because the descriptions in the Daily Digest are inserted
by the Committees themselves. If for any reason they fail to submit copy
to the Record, there is no entry for any hearings or meetings they may
have held. Second, the descriptions submitted are not always as clear as
one might hope. We guarded against error by double-coding any ques-
tionable entries in the Digest. Third, the data are records of hearings
and meetings, not other activities of the committees. They, therefore,
do not necessarily include such efforts as staff investigations and the like
which can be important aspects of oversight, unless those efforts are
reflected in hearings and meetings. Finally, oversight may occur as a by-
product of hearings and meetings held by congressional committees for
other purposes. Accordingly, the data analyzed in this article under-
estimate the amount of oversight because they consider only the
primary purpose of each hearing or meeting as described in the Daily
Digest.
CHANGES IN COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY
Most congressional committees are quite busy and the evidence
indicates that the number of hearings and meetings held by them has
increased significantly since 1969, the first year coded in our data set.
Table I presents the number of hearings and / or meetings series coded in
each of the four Congresses, the total number of days spent in hearings
and meetings, and the mean days per series for all House and Senate
committees except Appropriations, Rules, and Administration.5 The
committees dealing with rules and administration were excluded from
the analysis because of their preoccupation with internal chamber
business. The appropriations committees were excluded for reasons of
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TA8l.£ 1
PfequwtMy of Committee or Subcommittee Hearings and
Meetings Itt the House and Senate, by Congr*e
NOTE: Entfies are for the January 1 to July 4 period of the first year of each session of the
Ninety-First to Ninety-Fourth Congresses
a Hearings and meetings hold by the Appropriations, Rules, and Adititiistration committees
in each chamber have been exiluded.
b. A series is defined as a set of hearmngs and/or meetings on one subject, topic, or theme.
c. The total number of days is derives by adding the number of days of hearings and/or meet-
tings in each series.
comparability since the House Committee followed its unique tradition
until the Ninety-Third Congress of reporting very few of its hearings
or meetings for inclusion in the Daily Digest.
They total number of hearings and meetings series increased rapidly
in both the House and the Senate in this period. The Senate workload
shows some signs of leveling off in the Ninety-Fourth Congress (there
was a dip in the total days column from the Ninety-Third), perhaps
indicating a rough saturation point in the area of -1,000 hearings or
meetings in a six-month period for the Senate committees coded here.
What is clear is that committees in both bodies meet even more often
than they did just a few years ago and that more and more matters are
taken up in each session.6
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Table 2, which displays data on oversight hearings and meetings,
shows a fairly consistent pattern of increases both in the number of
series and in the total days devoted to oversight. The one exception is
found in the House where the number of oversight series decreased
slightly from the Ninety-First to the Ninety-Second Congress while the
total number of oversight days dropped rather precipitously. This rela-
tively steep drop in the number of days devoted to oversight is a function
of a drop in the mean number of days spent on oversight per series. As
the change from a standard deviation of 5.55 in the House in the Ninety-
First Congress to 2.40 indicates, there were fewer extreme cases in the
. Ninety-Second Congress. In fact, one oversight series of 33 days of
hearings and meetings in the Ninety-First Congress is the culprit. This
was the largest series by far, the next longest oversight series recorded
in the period covered by the data being 16 days long. At any rate, with
the one exception described, oversight not only increased in absolute
terms from Congress to Congress, but it held its own as a percentage of
a rapidly increasing committee workload. It began to rise in the House
in the Ninety-Third Congress as a percentage of total series of hearings
and meetings and in the Ninety-Fourth Congress exploded into promi-
, nence in both chambers as a major percentage both of series and of
hearings and meeting days.
How does one explain this change in congressional oversight be-
havior ? Earlier, I outlined a group of factors which have been identified
as promoting a greater incidence of oversight. Split partisan control of
the presidency and Congress has been a constant factor in the period
covered by the analysis and unfortunately, therefore, its direct impact
on oversight activity cannot be assessed using these data.7 In addition,
the data, because of limited information in the Daily Digest, are not
! appropriate to answer questions about the relationship between over-
t sight activity and such factors as casework problems, attempts to satisfy
group interests important to the Senator or Congressman, or the desire
to protect favored agencies. Additional analytic work could be done in
these areas by evaluating hearings transcripts and interviewing partici-
pants. However, the data collection problem will be a difficult one since
the investigator would ideally like to know not only what motivated a
given instance of oversight activity, but when similar conditions (case-
work problems and the like) existed and no oversight resulted.
Fortunately, there are some data presently available which can help
to probe the relationships between the remainder of the factors iden-
tified earlier and oversight activity. Turning first to staff resources, it
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TARLE 2
Oversight Hearings and Meetings by House and
Senate Committees or Subcommittees, by Congress
NOTE. Entries are for the January 1 to July 4 pettod of the first year bf each Session of the
Nmety-First to Ninety-Fourth Congresses
a Hearings and meetmgs held by the Appropriations, Rules, and Administration Committees
In each oftamber have been excluded
b. See Table 1 for a count of the total number of series.
c. See Table 1 for a count of the total number of days
was hypothesized that oversight would increase as a function of the
number of staff available to committees and subcommittees. Infor-
mation collected by the Temporary Select Committee to Study the
Senate Committee System on numbers of staff members available to
House and Senate Committees is the basis of the rather remarkable
plot found in Figure 1. The horizontal axis is the total number of per-
manent, inquiries and investigation staff available in 1969, 1971, 1973,
and 1975 to all Senate Committees as reported by the Temporary Select
Committee (1976) and the vertical axis is the total number of days
Senate Committees spent on oversight in those years. The total number
of days Senate Committees spent on oversight during this period
appears to bear an almost linear relationship to the total staff available.
Before declaring increases in staff the definitive factor promoting
more oversight, a few cautions are in order. First of all, Figure 1 covers
a very short time span and chance may be at work here. The data might
not be quite so neat if a longer series could be examined.8 Second, while
complete data on staff growth for the House are not available, the data
for 1969 and 1971 which are presented by the Temporary Select Com-
mittee present a problem. Staff in the House grew from 688 to 799 in this
period, while a look at Table 2 will show that total days of oversight
in the House fell during this same time span. Perhaps the relationship
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between staff and oversight only exists in the Senate, but one would
want to see more data on both chambers before reaching that conclu-
sion. Third, correlation does not indicate causation and.in the case of
these variables the direction of causality is not absolutely clear, More
staff may be promoting oversight, but the reverse may also be true and
the desire of Senators to oversee the bureaucracy may be leading them
to hire more staff. If the latter is correct, when and if the desire abates,
staff increases may well be associated with constant or even decreasing
levels of oversight.9 My own feeling on this point is that the system is
a complex one in which additional people are slack resources some of
whom find their way into oversight activity regardless of the priorities
of their employers, but the key point for now is that one should be
cautious in interpreting these data.
Next, let us examine the committee structure factor. This factor is an
extremely important one for those interested in reform because, liketh9
staff factor, it is very much subject to planned manipulation.
Two propositions were outlined earlier. The first is that the more
decentralized the committee, the greater the likelihood of oversight. In
order to make a satisfactory test of this proposition one would want to
develop good measures of the dispersal of power over money, staff, and
the agenda in each committee and then relate them to the level of over-
sight activity, Such measures are not currently available, but one crude
indicator of decentralization-the number of subcommittee on the full
COJllmitteelO-doeE not show very promising results. The average
correlation between the number of subcommittees and the amount of
oversight conducted (the oversight indicator was coded here as a
dummy variable, i,e., I = oversight and 0 = other) is .05 in the House and
.01 in the Senate for the four Congresses in the data set. In addition,
the correlations in the House for the Ninety-Third and Ninety-Fourth
Congresses, those after the passage of the so-called &dquo;Subcommittee
Bill of Rights&dquo; (Ornstein, 1975), were -.02 and .05, respectively.
The second proposition on committee structure outlined above,
namely that the establishment of oversight committees or subcommittees
is likely to lead to an increase in oversight activity, seems very promis-
ing. These units would have oversight as a major mandate and the
assumption is that if they are active at all they will be more likely than
other units to devote their efforts to overseeing the executive. Fortu-
nately, it is fairly easy to identify existing oversight committees and
subcommittees (which we will call oversight units) and to compare their
behavior to that of nonoversight units.
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(Figure ’1: Staff Size Versus Days c~~ Oversight Hearigs and Meet’~ea~s, Senate
In Table 3 the percentages of hearings and meetings series devoted to
oversight ~~t~ presented both for oversight units and for the remainder
of the committees and subcommittees. The data are further divided by
chamber and Congress. Oversight units are defined as the Government
Operations Committees in both chambers and subcommittees of other
committees which have such identifying labels as oversight and depart-
ment operations in their titles.
A look at the t~l~l~ will show some very clear findings in the House.
Oversight units do indeed devote more series of hearings and meetings
to oversight than other committee units. The differences are quite
pronounced. Indeed, the average correlation (r) between dummy vari-
ambles for the oversight and committee units indicators is .28.11
Both oversight and nonoversight units have increased their oversight
percentages since the Ninety-First Congress. However, the House over-
sight units’ share of the total oversight series, i.e.&dquo; the percentage of the
total oversight series in each Congress which they conducted, has
dropped from ~~f. ~~~ in the January I to July 4 period of 1969 (the
Ninety-First Congress) to 30.5% in the comparable period of 1975
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(the Ninety-Fourth Congress). 12 This drop resulted from the fact that
the percentages of series devoted to oversight rose more steeply for the
nonoversight than for the oversight units. The difference in oversight
percentage growth rates was enough to overcome the greater percentage
increase in the number of series held by the oversight units.
In the end, then, one must conclude both that the oversight units
on the House committees do spend a higher proportion of their time on
oversight series than the nonoversight units and that the large increase
in oversight found in the House t;annot be accounted for simply by the
increase in activities of the oversight units. What has happened is that
most everyone is now getting into the act in a bigger way than before.
Before discussing a factor which may have contributed to this substan-
tial increase in oversight effort, let me say a few words about the data on
oversight units in the Senate.
The Senate data on the percentages of series devoted to oversight by
oversight committee units resembles that found in the House (i.e., much
higher percentages) only in the Ninety-Fourth Congress. One wonders
why there are virtually no differences for any of the other Congresses.
The main reason is that in the Ninety-First, Ninety-Second, and Ninety-
Third Congresses the Senate Government Operations Committee was
the only oversight unit which held any hearings or meetings at all. (In
fact, it was the only one in existence in the Senate.) This is important
because the Government Operations Committees, unlike most of the
oversight subcommittee units, has a firm legislative mandate and, there-
fore, is likely to be occupied with tasks other than oversights The com-
mittee, for instance, was very busy during much of the period before the
Ninety-Fourth Congress shaping complex legislation such as the Budget
and Impoundment Control Act. Only in the Ninety-Fourth Congress do
oversight units from Senate committees other than Government Opera-
tions begin to appear in the data. I am reluctant, therefore, to reach
any firm conclusions about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of Senate
oversight units in producing actual oversight activity. Before reaching
such conclusions, I would wait until there are a few more oversight sub-
committee on regular Senate authorization committees and then
examine their behavior.
There is one final factor discussed above which is said to make
oversight more attractive to legislators. The relationship between that
factor, labeled &dquo;corruption, crisis and publicity,&dquo; and increases in over-
sight is not the easiest to establish, but Watergate, which was a mixture
of all three seems to have had a clear impact. As Table 2 demonstrated,
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TABLE 3
Percentages of House and Senate Hearings and Meetings
Series devoted to Oversight, by Committee Unit
and Congress
NOTE Entries are for the January 1 io July 4 period of the first year of each session of the
Ninety-First to Ninety-Fourth Congresses
a Oversight committee units are defined as the Government Operations Committees In both
chambers and subcommittees of other committees which have such identifying labels as over-
sight and department operations m their titles Hearings and meetmgs held by the Appropria-
tions, Rules, and Administration Committees rn each chamber have been excluded
b Ns in parentheses are the bases upon which percentages are calculated
the absolute number of oversight series and days generally increased
during the period of the Ninety-First to Ninety-Fourth Congresses, but
oversight really jumped into prominence as a major percentage of the
daily activities of House and Senate committees in the post-Watergate
{Ninety-Fourth) Congress. While other factors are surely important, it
is highly unlikely that the juxtaposition of the Watergate crisis and the
literal explosion of oversight is mere coincidence.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The very rapid recent growth in oversight may well be a temporary phe-
nomenon-a fad inspired by the political currents flowing from Water-
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gate. There is certainly a faddish element to it at the moment and the
level of oversight activity may well fade soon. However, there arc
reasons to think that a fairly solid foundation for substantial -oversight
activity does exist (although not necessarily at the very high levels found
in the Ninety-Fourth Congress) and the data developed in this study
indicate some factors which can be manipulated in an effort to maintain
a high incidence of oversight activity by congressional committees.
The whole Nixon period brought into focus a growing imbalance of
power between the executive and legislative branches. As the data sh~w,
congressional activity increased rather dramatically from the Ninety-
First to the Ninety-Third Congress. Yet during this time oversight held
its own as a percentage of this growing activity, dipping only in the
House in the Ninety-Second Congress and recovering quickly in the
Ninety-Third Congress, a time when oversight reforms were an impor-
tant item on the Bolling Committee agenda. Watergate may well have
been the chief factor leading to the dramatic increase in oversight
recorded in the Ninety-Fourth Congress, but there was already a
substantial and growing base of oversight activity prior to that time. I
suspect that the pre-Watergate increase in oversight activity derived
from the suspicion of presidential power which developed in the
Johnson Administration mainly as a result of the Vietnam war and on a
widespread disillusionment with many of the programs of the 1960s,
Even during Nixon’s first term Congress attempted to place limits on
presidential war and spreading powers and initiated serious debate on
program priorities. Oversight tended to increase as a natural con-
comitant of these efforts (and related changes in congressional rules and
resources), and as a response to a growing attentive public which
showed an interest in congressional efforts to control the executive
branch. My argument, in essence, is that Watergate stimulated over-
sight activity, but that it occurred in a context of related stimuli and
reinforced them. If this is so, one would expect the observed increases
in oversight activity to persist-although perhaps not at quite such
high levels-even as memories of Watergate per se recede.
Turning now to factors which the data suggest might be manipulated
to encourage oversight, two stand out: increased committee staffs and
the establishment of more oversight units. On the first, some cautions
against too simple an interpretation of the data are expressed in the
article, but the evidence does at least suggest that increasing committee
staff resources has an impact on oversight activity. As noted, the impact
is probably less dramatic than a first glance at Figure 1 would lead one
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to think. However, even if one believes merely that some new staff
people will haphazardly find their way into oversight, then further
increases- in staff will help maintain 6t even increase oversight activity,
Staff eatrntadted for oversight duty are even more likely to have this
effect, though one would realistically expect much slippage between
the duties they ate supposed to perform and their actual assignments.
The second factor, oversight units, potentially is important not
because it is likely to increase oversight activity greatly, but because
of its potential as a backstop. The data indicate that oversight units,
particularly oversight subcommittees without major legislative author-
ity, do spend a much higher proportion of their time in oversight activ-
ities than nonoversight units. They were by no means the major factor
responsible for the increases in oversight activity reported in the data,
but the empanelling of more oversight subcommittees should establish a
base for a higher minimum level of oversight in the Congress.
In during, let me say a few words about some priorities for future
research. First, research of the type reported here will benefit from a
longer time frame, particularly in terms of establishing a norm for
oversight in the pre-Nixon years, testing the import of split partisan
control, and gaining a better understanding of the relationship between
committee staff size and oversight behavior. Second, oversight some-
times occurs in hearings and meetings held primarily for some other
purpose such as authorizing or appropriating money for ongoing
programs. A more comprehensive study design would take this fact
into account through such means as content analysis of hearing and
meeting transcripts and interviews with participants. It also would
consider oversight which occurred outside of the formal hearing or
meeting framework. Third, much more work needs to be done on the
quality issue. Case studies of various types of oversight efforts probably
would be the best way to begin to understand better the conditions leading
to more comprehensive and systematic oversight. Finally, not enough is
known about the impact of oversight activity on the actions of admin-
istrators. Just what effects does oversight really have? An assumption
was made at the beginning of the study that more oversight, even if it is
not comprehensive or systematic, is better than less because of its likely
impact on administrators’ behavior. This assumption, while plausible, is
so central to making decisions about reforms aimed at increasing the




1. I use the adverb usually because oversight can be performed in a terribly destruc-
tive manner if Congress does not exercise a minimum level of self-restraint. The prime
example is the McCarthy "investigation" of government personnel practices in the 1950s.
2. There are certainly benefits to be gained from reviewing a program in a persistent
yet unsystematic manner. However, the major payoff from either sporadic or regular
unsystematic oversight probably comes from the anticipation by the administrators that
the overseers just might uncover something embarrassing.
3. See, especially Scher (1963), Ogul (1976) and Bibby (1968, 1974).
4. The data are presented in Appendix G of the report, pp. 267-275. The percentage
of all hearing and meeting days devoted to oversight, in what must be a typographical
error, is erroneously presented as 1.1% (p. 268) rather than 11% in that report. (The raw
numbers show 231 days devoted to oversight out of a total of 2,095 days.)
5. The hearings or meetings of formal Joint Committees and those held jointly by
House and Senate Committees were also excluded from the analysis. Hearings or meetings
of party committees (e.g., steering, policy, and personnel committees) were not included
in the data set.
6. I have not yet had the time to analyze these data fully, but one would certainly
want to look at such factors as increasing staff resources, larger numbers of liberal Demo-
crats, and changing patterns in committee and subcommittee chairmanships for explana-
tions of the pattern presented in the table.
7. Split partisan control might also be very important as a contextual factor influenc-
ing the relationship between other variables and oversight, but one would require data
from a period in which the same party controlled the two institutions in order to establish
this. Relevant data for the Eighty-Seventh to Ninetyth and the Ninety-Fifth Congresses
are now being processed.
8. It is food for thought that on the plane of general activity, staff increases were
quite pronounced in the Senate committees between 1973 and 1975, yet overall committee
hearings and meetings days actually dropped.
9. Staff has been on the increase for quite some time, although not quite at the recent
rate. A longer time frame for the analysis will provide some additional evidence from
which to infer the ways in which these variables operate in the Congress.
10. The assumption here is that the larger the number of subcommittees, the more
dispersed power is likely to be. This assumption is probably a reasonable one in most cases
but there are some potential pitfalls. For example, in a committee with many subcom-
mittees the chairman and a small clique might control the key subcommittees which have
jurisdiction over the crucial programs within the committee’s jurisdiction.
11. The oversight activity indicator was coded as oversight = 1, other = 0.
12. The percentages for the Ninety-Second and Ninety-Third Congresses were 35.5%
and 29.0%, respectively.
13. The House Government Operations Committee, I should note as supplementary
evidence, was below the average of oversight units in its oversight efforts, although not as
low as in the Senate.
515
REFERENCES
BIBBY, J. F. (1974) "Oversight&mdash;Congress’ neglected function: will Watergate make a
difference?" Presented at the 1974 Meeting of the Western Political Science Associa-
tion.
&mdash;&mdash;&mdash; (1968) "Congress’ neglected function," pp. 477-488 in M. Laird (ed.) Republican
Papers. New York: Praeger.
HARRIS, J. (1964) Congressional Control of Administration. Washington, DC: Brook-
ings Institution.
OGUL, M. (1976) Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh
Press.
ORNSTEIN, N. J. (1975) "Causes and consequences of congressional change: subcom-
mittee reforms in the House of Representatives, 1970-73," in N. J. Ornstein (ed.)
Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform. New York: Praeger.
SCHER, S. (1963) "Conditions for legislative control." J. of Politics (August): 526-661.
SCHICK, A. (1976) "Evaluating evaluation: a congressional perspective," pp. 341-354 in
Legislative Oversight and Program Evaluation. Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office.
SINGER, J. W. (1978) "Labor and Congress-new isn’t necessarily better." National J.
(March): 351-353.
U. S. Congress, Commission on the Operation of the Senate (1976) Interim Report of the
Commission on the Operation of the Senate, Senate Document, Ninety-Fourth
Congress, 2nd session.
U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Committees (Bolling Committee), Committee
Reform Amendments of 1974, Report to Accompany House Resolution 988, Ninety-
Third Congress, 2nd session, House Report 93-916, Part II.
U.S. Congress, Senate Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee
System (1976) The Senate Committee System, Committee Print, Ninety-Fourth
Congress, 2nd session.
